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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
I 
I --------------------
I 
fTATE OF UTAH, ) 
Respondent, ) 
--vs-- ) Case No. 10057 
IWAYNE PEARSON, ) 
Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE.MENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged pursuant to an 
information charging him of violation of Title 
?6, Chapter 50, Section 2, Utah Code Annotated, 
l953, Escape from the Utah State Prison. He 
was tried on the 7th day of October, 1963, in 
- 2 -
I 
~he 'Third Judicial District Court in front of 
i 
1udge and Jury. 
i 
i 
DISPOSITION MADE BY THE LOWER COURT 
The jury rendered a verdict of guilty. 
!Appellant was sentenced for not less than one 
I 
The 
!year and not more than ten years to commence at 
:the expiration of the sentence for which he is 
!now incarcerated. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Reversal of Trial Court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 22, 1963, in broad daylight, 
Appellant escaped from the Utah State Prison, 
climbing two fences amid gunfire, and driving 
away in a visitor• s au to. The next day he 
surrendered to the Assistant Warden (T-18). 
Appellant testified in his own behalf 
(T-20). He stated that two weeks before he had 
had a fight with an inmate over a radio, 
Which Appellant had accidently broken. A 
- 3 -
few days later he, "was beat up," (T-21). 
Appellant reported this incident to 
.Officer Cole, a guard, and Lieutenant Coleman 
i 
. (T-22). He had tried to see the Warden (T-23); 
. tried to be put in isolation (T-23); thought his 
1 life was in danger (T-23). He was informed that 
he could not be moved until the Deputy Warden's 
okay came through (T-23). 
After being beaten up again by five 
individuals, he again contacted a guard; but 
~e guard on duty could not contact Lieutenant 
Coleman (T-24, 25) . On another occasion he 
was informed that he could not be moved "with-
out cause," and was told he should kick out a 
Window. He was beaten up again (T-25) . 
Immediately before Appellant escaped, he 
~ias knifed (T-26), and told by two or three 
inmates, "We 1 11 kill you! " He then ran through 
the Chapel, hiding there a few minutes from 
- 4 -
his pursuers (T-28-34), and proceeded across 
the fences (T-28-34) . 
During cross-examination, Appellant stated 
that he had not been planning the escape for a 
considerable time, but only that night. He 
said that he had thought about escaping with 
the three beatings, but left only when "that 
knife came out," (T-29). 
The court refused to allow Appellant to 
answer the question whether he felt that if he 
did not escape that he would be killed (T-32). 
The court, taking the position that the 
Appellant had to be pursued by someone at the 
instance that he escaped before the defense of 
coercion could be raised, further stated (in 
front of the jury), "If I am cornered, and I 
have to go over the fence to escape with my 
life, that is justification. If I am threatened 
over a period of three days, I don 1 t think that 
- 5 -
is. The defense then established that the 
time was ten minutes after Appellant was knifed 
(T-32) that he went over the fence. 
Appellant admitted that after going over 
the first fence he could have stopped, but did 
not. The reason given was that he was only 
thinking of getting away (T-35) • 
After the defense rested, the trial judge, 
on motion of the prosecutor, instructed the 
jury to disregard the Appellant's testimony as 
to coercion and duress. The Court further 
refused Appellant's proposed jury instruction 
in this regard. 
STATE.MENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE: 
THE COURT ERRED IN STRICKING APPELLANT'S 
TESTIMONY AS TO COERCION. 
POINT TWO: 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY AS TO COERCION. 
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ARGUE.MENT OF THE POINTS 
Even though there are two points of appeal, 
they are both concerning the trial court 1 s 
attitude toward the defense of coercion; and 
the same law applies. They will be treated 
together for the purpose of this brief. 
Utah Code Annotated, 76-1-41, provides, 
"All persons are capable of committing 
crimes except those belonging to the 
following classes: ••. 9: 
1 Persons, unless the crime is punishable 
with death, who commit the act or make 
the omission charged under threats or 
menaces sufficient to show that they 
have reasonable cause to believe, and 
do believe, their lives will be 
endangered if they refuse. 111 
Appellant's Instruction No. 1, refused by 
llie trial judge, stated: 
"A person is not capable of committing 
a crime when the action done was done 
under threats or means sufficient to 
show that the defendant had reasonable 
cause to believe and did believe that 
his life would be endangered if he 
refused. 11 
• 
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May it be noted that the Instruction quotes 
ilie statute; hence, arguement to the effect that 
the Instruction, if not the law, would not be 
well taken. 
Generally the courts have said that by 
common law the defense of coercion is available 
except in capital cases, but that to constitute 
llie defense the coercion must be present, 
imminent, and impending, and of such a nature 
as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of 
death or serious bodily injury if the act is 
not done. 
This court must decide if under our statute 
there must be imminentness. Our legislature 
seems to base the criteria on "reasonableness 11 
rather than imminentness. Reasonableness is a 
:nuch better criteria, which might include 
imminentness, but which is broader. However, 
"'en where imminentness is required the courts 
--
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.1ave held that coercion is a jury question 
1xcept in cases where imminentness is obviously 
lacking. 
State v St. Clair, (Mo., 1953), 262, SW 2nd, 
15, was a robbery case, the Classical one: 
~fundant claimed if he did not go along, he 
would be killed. 'I1he court, in a very good 
focision, goes into the law stating imminentness 
as the criteria, and whether or not defendant 
could have avoided the criminal act. 'I1he court 
reversed and remanded stating that the question 
is one for the jury. 
In White v State, (Tex., 1947), 203 P 2nd, 
222, again the Classical robbery case where 
defendant feared death if he did not participate, 
the court states: 
"Whether (the defendant) was under 
duress or merely pretended to be 
was a question of fact to be solved 
by the jury." 
- 9 -
The case held the trial court in error for not 
so instructing. 
The courts have more trouble when they get 
away from the case book example. In Commonwealth 
v Reffitt, (Ky., 1912), 149 Ky. 300, 148 SW 48, 
the defendant sold pooled tobacco and claimed 
that he originally joined the pool because he 
was afraid of the ''N;ight Raiders," a local 
pooled tobacco group, that had done some burning 
and whipping in the area. The court held that 
coercion was a jury question. It is noted that 
imminentness is not gone into in this case, nor 
were defendant• s fears overt. The threat was 
a silent one coming from the "Raiders'" actions 
to other non-pooled farmers. The court felt 
that the question of duress was best left to 
the jury. Perhaps the local citizenry knew 
rnore about the "Night Raiders" than did the 
- 10 -
judges. The sutle threats of the "Night 
Raiders" might be compared to the sutle threats 
of idle inmates at the Utah State Prison, who 
have been known to fulfill their threats by 
' 
severing a man's head, (State v Garcia, 11 Ut. 1 
2nd67, 355 Pac. 2nd, 57), and cutting them j '. 
in half, (State v Langley, unreported). 
'·, 
People v Mcclinton, (Mich., 1916), 160 
~, 465, was a perjury action where the 
defendant claimed that he lied the first time 
he testified because of police officers• 
threats. The court reversed saying the defense 
of coercion is a jury question. 
In People v Otis, (Cal., 1959), 344 P 2, 
" 142, the defendant was found guilty of possession :-l 
,>fa knife in prison. His defense was that being ~.· 
1in prison he was afraid that other prisoners ~ 
., ~' 
' ~-
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1ight harm him; and he needed the protection of 
i knife. The Supreme Court of California felt 
,hat this was not imminent. However, it is 
Qointed out that the trial court did give an 
instruction on duress in this case; but not as 
liberal as the defense desired. 
The defense of duress and coercion should 
not be limited to the classical case where a 
man holds a gun on the defendant and orders him 
,to commit a crime. Duress and coercion may be 
! 
I 
sutle, for example, where the defendant is left 
with no other alternative to save his life, but 
to commit a crime. Self preservation may lead 
us to do an act which not under such coercion 
~uld be criminal. At least the defendant 
should be able to put his theory of the case 
to a jury and let them determine whether or 
not his story is reasonable. 
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CONCLUSION 
The defense of coercion and duress, as 
asked for in Appellant 1 s instructions was a way 
?erhaps of saying that the Appellant has a right 
:o the defense of self-defense. Appellant had 
the right to kill his agressor, (a crime) ; hence, 
~1e should be able to commit a lessor crime to 
:scape from his agressor. If one were to jay 
I 
i11alk or run a stop sign to get away from an 
i !agressor, no one would critize. The fact that 
:this Appellant climbed a fence at the Utah State 
I 
I 
Prison should not be any different. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MITSUNAGA AND ROSS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
